















The Report Committee for Juan Manuel Avila Conejo 
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following report: 
 
 
Silence: History and the existential threat of nuclear war  



















Silence: History and the existential threat of nuclear war  








Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Master of Arts 
 
 










Silence: History and the existential threat of nuclear war  
in Memorias del Subdesarrollo and Hiroshima Mon Amour. 
 
Juan Manuel Avila Conejo, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
 
Supervisor:  Katherine Arens 
 
The paper focuses on the Cuban experience of the Missile Crisis, as portrayed in 
Edmundo Desnoes’ Memorias del Subdesarrollo (1968), while tracking the influence of 
Marguerite Duras’ Hiroshima Mon Amour (1959) in the nuclear threat narrative. The 
paper will compare the processes of historicization contained within the films and the 
books. That comparison serves to examine the impact that the peril of nuclear war had on 
the concepts of memory and history in the context of postmodernity. The Missile Crisis 
functions, I argue, as a historical event horizon that signaled the end of the metanarrative 
of reason-based history; as a kind of knot that produces an epistemological break in 
Western history.  
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После нас - тишина — After us, silence. 
Motto of the Russian Missile Troops 
In the popular mind, as well as in professional historiography and academic 
circles, the threat of nuclear war was, and remains, often the defining feature of the Cold 
War: it changed the way we understand the relationship between human beings and 
history, we who were now in control of the material conditions to effectively end history 
and human life. How, then, were the processes of memorialization and historicization 
affected by the rise and apex of the nuclear threat narrative?  
This question guides this project, which focuses on two narratives about key 
events of the Cold War that have become part of the cultural canons in their homelands 
and the world: the Bombing of Hiroshima as portrayed in Marguerite Duras‘ Hiroshima 
Mon Amour1 (1959), and the October Crisis2 as told by Desnoes‘ Memorias del 
Subdesarrollo3 (1968). This essay will examine how these narratives, both in text and 
film, grapple with how to historicize and render into narrative form the existential threat 
of nuclear war; and, in turn, how these two texts exemplify the emergence of this threat, 
affecting the conventional understanding of history and memory. Together, these texts 
                                                 
1  ―Hiroshima, My Love‖ (All translations by me.) 
2 The name of the Crisis itself is a major point of scholarly debate. In Anglo-American discourse, it is 
usually referred to as the ―Cuban Missile Crisis;‖ placing the emphasis on the fact that there were missiles 
in Cuba and reducing the event to a military or political confrontation. The Russian name for it is the 
Карибский кризис, or the ―Caribbean Crisis,‖ which artfully avoids acknowledging that there were 
missiles involved, and instead presents the events as geopolitical in nature. The Cuban name for the affair, 
the ―Crisis de Octubre‖ or ―October Crisis,‖ is the most appropriate for the purposes of this paper, as it 
frames the issue as one not limited by geography or geopolitics; one that greatly affected the temporal (and 
thus historical) narratives about the Cold War, in particular, and modernist history, in general. 





bookend the global nuclear threat: its beginning with the Bombing of Hiroshima, and the 
October Crisis as its climax. This span of time and events became the existential moment 
of modernity, the moment when the limits of rationality were exposed and the modernist 
conception of history was exhausted; the moment that led to the collective realization of 
modernity‘s mortality.  
I propose in what follows that the October Crisis is intrinsically connected to the 
crisis of inherited cultural metanarratives because, as a near-recurrence of Hiroshima, it 
made apparent the internal contradictions of modernity, a purported era of postwar peace 
which actually manifested as the tendency towards self-destruction, global instability, and 
crisis. The October Crisis made apparent that the West's metanarrative of rationality, both 
as the internal logic of history and as guiding principle for human agency, contained 
within itself the epistemic means of its own collapse; the condition of contradiction 
overpowering rationality as status quo.  
The present discussion will tie these two issues together. First, it rebuilds the 
historical narrative of the October Crisis to show how this event truly constituted a point 
of no return for the grand narrative of Western Civilization where the material conditions 
for the end of history were manifested. After outlining the event, I will argue that this 
narrative contains within it a critical breaking point of metanarratives and thus, it is the 
key to the understanding of postmodernity. I will theorize this event as a collective 
existential crisis, measuring its impact on historicization as, what I call, the ‗historical 
event horizon‘ that divides traditional teleological history from what Lyotard defined as 
the postmodern condition— the end of a kind of master historical narrative. Finally, I will 





this historical event horizon in two specific cases: the Franco-Japanese experience of 
Hiroshima (as origin of the nuclear threat) and the Cuban crisis (as climax of the nuclear 
threat) as the origin and culmination of the contradiction within the modern model of 
history and historiography, giving way to the intrusion of memory and the subjective 
experience. 
Context: The Cold War and its Threat Narratives 
The twentieth century saw the two largest armed conflicts ever before reaching its 
midpoint. World War I, the "war to end all wars," was quickly followed by World War II. 
After the wholesale devastation of Europe, during the Potsdam Conference on July 17, 
1945; the UK, the USA, and the USSR negotiated the partition of Europe: the west 
administered by the Allies, the east by the Soviets. This agreement meant the 
metaphorical descent of the Iron Curtain separating the Eastern and Western blocs. In the 
following years, relations between the USSR and the USA continued to deteriorate and 
led to the policy of ―Communist containment,‖ which emphasized that ―stopping Soviet 
expansion was the West‘s top priority‖ (Hillstrom 28). In 1947, President Truman 
committed to actively ―support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or by outside pressures‖ (Hillstrom 43). This commitment translated 
into policy as a determination to counter the Soviet Union, or any real or perceived 
international Soviet involvement, at every move. The fundamental opposition of the Cold 
War was set into place:  "Communists" as a threat against the West. 
The situation escalated when the ideology was reinforced by the military, and a 
new commitment to nuclear warfare, purportedly keeping the peace through a policy of 





program detonated its first device in 1949, the RDS-1 (Hillstrom 69), the same year the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed—by no means a coincidence. In response 
to the creation of NATO, and particularly to the inclusion of West Germany in it, the 
Warsaw Pact was formed in 1955, which included the Soviet Union, East Germany, and 
most of Eastern Europe. These two ‗defense alliances‘ formed the map onto which the 
battle of Communism versus democracy was to be projected.  During the 1950s, the 
Korean War was understood in the terms set up by these decisions.  The Korean conflict 
was characterized by Truman as Communism‘s attempt to ―conquer independent nations‖ 
(Hillstrom 70) through invasion and war. Stalin, on the contrary, more directly continued 
narratives from the Second World War rather than allude to post-war developments, 
when he deemed the Korean War a struggle ―for liberation from the imperialist yoke‖ 
(Hillstrom 80).  
What is striking about such political narratives from the period between the end of 
World War II and the October Crisis, both superpower blocs arrogated unto themselves 
absolute teleological historical justification; meaning both claimed to have history on 
their side, allowing them to claim their actions as rational and within the framework of 
threat and military enforced peace. 
Just a few years later, in 1953, the power of this historical narrative would 
manifest itself in the Cuban Revolution. Initially, the uprising of the people against a 
corrupt government of elites was positively received by both the USA and the USSR. 
Both traced narratives of these events as a nationalist revolution not aligned with either 
power.  When the Cuban revolution that had started in 1953 finally came to a conclusion 





the right-wing, military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista was heavily backed by the US.  
Through the Cold War Framework, the subsequent events became understood as an 
ongoing struggle of communism against capitalism.   
During the revolution, the Communist party of Cuba sided with the Batista regime 
and not with the revolutionary movement. Soon after taking over, the Castro government 
―moved decisively to reshape Cuba as a Communist nation,‖ (Hillstrom 233) 
nationalizing the oil and sugar industries, which represented major economic interests of 
the United States, and gaining the favor of the communist party. Although the Platt 
Amendment (―An Act Making appropriation for the support of the Army‖ 11), which had 
given the United States power over Cuban defense and foreign affairs in the aftermath of 
the Spanish-American war had been abrogated in 1934, the new revolutionary 
government sought to eliminate any colonial links between the two countries. The anti-
Americanism of the revolution made the United States increasingly worried, and the 
Soviets increasingly hopeful. As Khrushchev put it: ―They feared, as much as we hoped, 
that a socialist Cuba might become a magnet that would attract other Latin American 
countries to socialism‖ (―Khrushchev Remembers‖ 492). A socialist, even if not yet 
Soviet-aligned, independent Cuba simply would not do for the Eisenhower 
administration.  
Slowly but surely, the Cuban revolution became more and more aligned with the 
Soviet Union as it became its principal trading partner and international backer. The 
White House charged the Central Intelligence Agency to come up with a plan to 
―remove‖ Castro (Jones 13), which included working with the ―Mafia‖ to assassinate 





with a group of 1400 men, set to land on the Bay of Pigs, which would then serve as the 
spark to start an anti-revolutionary war. The invasion was a failure and further inflamed 
the animosity between Cuba and the United States (Hillstrom 234). In Washington, 
support for a major military action against Cuba mounted, including major voices in and 
out of the administration, the likes of Richard Nixon (Jones 14) and General Curtis 
LeMay, whose command had dropped the atomic bombs over Japan (Morris 13:05). 
President Kennedy himself participated, aboard the Enterprise aircraft carrier, in the 
military exercise ―Quick Kick‖ which simulated an invasion of a Caribbean island. The 
exercise, which mobilized more than 40,000 troops, took place on the east coast of the 
United States and on the Puerto Rican island of Vieques (Jiménez Gómez 65). This move 
was interpreted by the Cubans as an aggression and a threat; and the final step into the 
Crisis took place in June 1962, when Kennedy and Khrushchev met in Austria to discuss 
Berlin and nuclear proliferation; however, the summit ended in ―a diplomatic disaster‖ 
(Hillstrom 234).  
Khrushchev, aware of the presence of US nuclear missiles in Turkey, Italy, and 
the UK and convinced that a US invasion of Cuba was imminent, decided to send Soviet 
nuclear missiles to the Caribbean (―Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes‖ 170). 
Castro, who had originally sought a declaration of military aid from the USSR, was not 
interested, at least initially, in obtaining nuclear missiles. But Khrushchev‘s view 
prevailed and, secretly in merchant ships, the Soviet Union began smuggling nuclear 
weapons and medium range missiles as well as thousands of troops into Cuba. Both 
countries then began building the missile launch sites under the cover of the tropical 





CIA that ―dozens of Soviet missiles with nuclear warheads were being deployed to Cuba‖ 
(Hillstrom 234) Although the United States had obtained evidence of the presence of 
Soviet weaponry in the island, the Kennedy administration had no precise information 
about the number of missiles, nor if they were operational. The following 13 days would 
be marked by tense negotiations, distrust, and chance.  
The full scope of the Crisis was not clear until thirty years later when, in a 
meeting with Fidel Castro in 1992, former Secretary of Defense and advisor to President 
John F. Kennedy Robert McNamara learned that during the crisis there were up to 162 
nuclear weapons in Cuba (Morris 16:35), including dozens of medium-range missiles that 
could reach the east coast in minutes. After regaining composure, McNamara and 
company finally realized how close it had been: ―in the event that the communications 
link with Moscow might be severed, Soviet field commanders were authorized to use 
tactical nukes against an American invasion‖ (Kennedy 8), an invasion that was being 
planned and pushed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Crisis developed.  
This is the crucial moment for the West's historical narrative: although the parties 
involved did not know so at the time, all the material conditions for the consummation of 
the nuclear threat were given. I will quote Premier Khrushchev at length describing this 
exact moment and the consequences of invading Cuba, to show that his view of history 
had become virtually apocalyptic:  
If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is 
evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, 
however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this 





of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us 
pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot 
will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, 
and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for 
me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible 
forces our countries dispose (Khrushchev ―Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to 
President Kennedy, October 26, 1962‖). 
Khrushchev described with simplicity the epistemic content of this event: history had 
reached an endpoint, beyond which the chain of normal signifiers would cease to refer to 
experience and when the narrative itself would cross the threshold of the historical event 
horizon to become a narrative of a quite different type.  
The metaphor of the rope and the knot allows us to consider the October Crisis as 
more than a political and military conflict. These are narratives of collapse, reflecting an 
epistemic crisis, the end of the metanarrative of a reason-based understanding of history. 
The tension between East and West, both with their own credible claim to rationality, had 
led to the creation of the material conditions to destroy all narratives, including that of 
rationality itself. When understood in this light, the Crisis constitutes a unique event, one 
which, in a metaphorical space, constitutes a boundary outside of there are no more 
historical events to be understood in conventional terms. The incompleteness intrinsic in 
the two parties' subjective perspective led to a seemingly rational view of reality that, 
suddenly, had become untenable. There can be no complete theory of the world; there are 





Postmodernity: When Metanarratives Fail 
 The rise of postmodernity is marked by the fall of grand narratives like 
those that came to an end with the October Crisis, creating what the French philosopher 
Jean-Francois Lyotard famously defined as ―incredulity toward metanarratives‖ (―The 
Postmodern Condition‖ XXIV). One of the first ―casualties‖ (XI) of postmodernity is, 
according to Marxist philosopher Fredric Jameson, the modernist conception of history 
and its telos. Throughout World War II, the fierce rhetoric of liberal democracy, fascism, 
and soviet communism contended against each other for the title of the master narrative 
of history, all sharing the claim to some kind of preordained fate, be it nationalism, 
individual liberty, or equality. Within these narratives persists a modernist Hegelian 
conception of history, that rests on the Hegelian notion ―that world history is governed by 
an ultimate design, that it is a rational process —whose rationality is not that of a 
particular subject, but divine and absolute— this is a proposition whose truth we must 
assume; its proof lies in the study of world history itself, which is the image and 
enactment of reason‖ (―Lectures on the Philosophy of World History‖ 28). With progress 
at its heart, the idea of an ascending, rational, and teleological history continued and was 
shared by both blocs of the Cold War: the liberal capitalism of the West, and the Soviet 
communism of the East.  
Understood in a dialectical framework the clash of ideas can be seen as part of a 
dialectical historical process. In this case, it would make sense to agree with Fukuyama 
about the end of history (‗end‘ here meaning completion; not cancelling) later in the 
century. But the October Crisis, although heavily resembling a dialectical moment, was 





internal logic: reason—it was a knot, not a dialectic. Both parties were convinced of the 
rationality of their positions, as well as of being on the ‗right side of history‘ and relied 
on the same narratives of reason and progress to sustain their irreconcilable positions. 
The Crisis, as a metonym for nuclear war, thus manifested the limits of rationality as a 
theory of history.  As McNamara points out ―We came that close to nuclear war. Rational 
individuals – Kennedy was rational, Khrushchev was rational, Castro was rational – 
rational individuals came that close to total destruction of their societies. And this danger 
exists today … In the end we lucked out. It was luck that prevented nuclear war.‖ (Morris 
15:00).  
It is also useful to examine this failure of the idea of history as process, with each 
era following from the previous one, according to an internal, coherent logic that 
eventually reaches the logical result of those steps: a completion. This characterization of 
history would make it independent, to a great degree, of human agency: it would be equal 
to a natural law for a materialist worldview, or the will of God for a theist one. In both of 
these scenarios, human beings are passengers in the metro of history. I posit that the 
counterfactual at the heart of this narrative crisis, the nuclear war following the Crisis, as 
well as the Crisis itself, marks a fundamental shift in the understanding of history. The 
event meant that history could no longer have a telos external to humans, since the 
material conditions were now present for humans to end, to cancel, history by their own 
choice and agency. The Crisis was, in a way, a collective existential crisis for modernity; 
the realization of its own (literal, bodily) mortality.  
This connection between historical narratives and the body can serve to 





of, ‗history‘ in academic literature referring to the era past the Cold War. Klein tracks the 
usage of the word in historical discourse, saying: ―History, as with other keywords, finds 
its meanings in large part through its counter-concepts and synonyms, and so the 
emergence of memory promises to rework history‘s boundaries. Those borders should 
attract our interest, for much current historiography pits memory against history even 
though few authors openly claim to be engaged in building a world in which memory can 
serve as an alternative to history‖ (128). The discovery of the boundaries of history 
demanded of critics a rethinking, not just about the boundaries of collective self-
imagination, but about the process of creating history itself. The emphasis on memory 
and conflicting narratives instead of history allows for new kinds of discourse to emerge, 
ones that are not bound by the presumption of rationality and individuality, and instead 
based on material conditions and experience, as Klein puts it a ―diverse and shifting 
collection of material artifacts and social practices‖ (130). Memory, contingent on 
materiality and interaction, is much more fragile than history, or more accurately, it is 
equally fragile but much more self-aware of its fragility.  
Let us continue examining Hegel‘s definition of history in order to better 
understand what has been lost when historical narratives turn into knots instead of 
conflicts: ―History combines in our language the objective as well as the subjective 
side…. It means both res gestae (the thing that happened) and historia rerum gestarum 
(the narration of things that happened)‖ (―The Philosophy of History‖ 76). In this 
historical model, the fact and the narrative are inextricably linked by reason and it seems 
to contain equal parts objectivity and subjectivity; providing a solid stability based on the 





rise of postmodern of incredulity towards metanarratives, make evident that the 
relationship between res gestae and historia rerum gestarum is not a one-to-one relation 
but a one-to-many relation: a single event can produce many histories; thus destabilizing 
the process.  
However, I must make a clarification: this is not an anti-materialist argument; it is 
true that ―It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their 
social existence that determines their consciousness‖ (Marx 11-12), but rather the results 
of said material conditions are not univocal. Here, it is useful to bring up 
phenomenological perspectivism, first formulated by Spanish philosopher José Ortega y 
Gasset. The idea here is that every object or situation produces an infinite number of 
possible perspectives, all equally authentic for their corresponding point-of-view (55). It 
is fair to say that an Ortega y Gassetian omniscient observer, who comprehends all 
possible perspectives through a single subjectivity, would be this Marx‘s perfectly-
determined-by-the-material-conditions consciousness. But, in nature human minds are 
limited in spacetime and, thus, in the number of perspectives that they can comprehend 
for a single object or event. Even collectives of human minds, such as the governments of 
the United States and the Soviet Union, could not comprehend the totality of the event 
unfolding in Cuba. Rationality is, thus, hard limited by the phenomenological nature of 
information.      
It is no coincidence, then, that existentialism rose in European thought after 
World War II alongside the narrative breakdown I have been describing. After the grand 
social narratives had led to the largest human conflict, the limits of rationality and the 





actions, and the need to understand those actions as history, is at the heart of Sartre‘s 
notion of existentialism, which ―affirms that every truth and every action imply an 
environment and a human subjectivity‖ (Sartre 18) and that ―Man is not only that which 
he conceives himself to be, but that which he wills himself to be, and since he conceives 
of himself only after he exists, just as he wills himself to be after being thrown into 
existence, man is nothing other than what he makes of himself‖ (Sartre 22).  
Existentialism declares as valid only narratives that proclaim the absolute freedom 
and agency of the individual human, which can be both empowering and crushing, since 
it rules out the possibility of an objective epistemic foundation for human life, and thus 
for history as well. This is the reason why I identify the Crisis as a collective existential 
crisis: although individual human mortality has always been a possibility, collective 
human mortality only became possible with the invention of the bomb, and only became 
probable and likely during the Crisis. As a result of individual and collective human 
agency‘s centrality in history, the line between history and memory has becomes 
increasingly blurry, once the era's politics moves beyond dialectic and into mutually 
assured destruction. As a result of the loss of telos and a grand unifying narrative after the 
bomb and after the October Crisis, it becomes harder and harder to fix, explain, and 
theorize history.  
History becomes principally contingent on one set of material conditions: human 
agency. We will begin by examining the origins of this existential crisis of the border 





First Archipelago: Japan 
Hiroshima Mon Amour (1959) is a French-Japanese film, directed by Alain 
Resnais, that portrays a conversation between a French actress and a Japanese architect in 
postwar Hiroshima. The story of the film itself is intertwined with the plot, which 
revolves around a French production crew shooting a documentary about the bombing of 
Hiroshima since the director of the film, Alain Resnais, initially set out to make a 
documentary about the atomic bomb, but ended up being unable to complete the task and 
instead made the film we know now (Monaco 34). Marguerite Duras wrote the 
screenplay and was actively participant in the production of the film, revising the text as 
the process went on, and calling the final result a ―false documentary‖ (Monaco 34), a 
film that uses documentary footage to tell a fictional story.  
 The film opens ominously, with a shot of bodies made of or covered in ash or 
sand. Extra-diegetically, their voices begin the struggle for the sovereignty of memory: 
―Lui — Tu n‘as rien vu, a Hiroshima. Elle — J‘ai tout vu. Tout‖ 4 (Duras 3:00). The 
opening line sets the tone for the rest of the film: not just narratives, but also the process 
of memory breaks down when confronted with the unspeakable. The unspeakable here is 
not a hyperbole. It is an act that, by virtue of its own ultra-violent nature, cannot be 
witnessed and recounted: ―You are informed that human beings endowed with language 
were placed in a situation such that none of them is now able to tell about it….How can 
you know that the situation itself exists?‖ (Lyotard ―Differend‖ 3). The oxymoronic form 
of the opening line raises an important issue: although She has seen everything in 
                                                 





Hiroshima (the place), meaning the material remains of the place as well as the museums 
for the victims; She could not have seen any part of the event.  
In this depiction, the ultra-violent nature of the bomb problematizes, not only how 
to historicize something that cannot be remembered, but even how to remember 
something that cannot be witnessed. She asks Him: ―Tu y-étais toi, à Hiroshima? —
Non… biensur‖5 (Duras 16:00) He responds, indicating the impossibility of witnessing 
this event. The film recognizes this problem as a mise-en-abîme: there is a film within a 
film, since the French actress is in Japan shooting a documentary; Hiroshima itself is not 
history, but a particular kind of fiction. This hierarchy can be seen as recognition of the 
limits of history as a narrative, itself circumscribed by the limits of reason, when facing 
the unspeakable. The recognition that, in different ways, both Hiroshima (the historical 
event) and Hiroshima (the film) are manufactured narratives attempting and failing to 
grasp the res gestae of the bombing. 
 After the event of the bombing, the very ability to remember has been 
compromised. ―Non, tu n'es pas douée de mémoire‖6 (Duras 11:00).  He says to Her. It is 
not that Her personal memory has disappeared, it is that the modernist conception of 
history that had thus far shaped Her individual and collective memory has been rendered 
obsolete and completely unable to describe (much less historize) an event like Hiroshima. 
―Comme toi, moi aussi, j‘ai essayé de lutter de toutes mes forces contre l‘oubli. Comme 
toi, j‘ai oublié. Comme toi, j‘ai désiré avoir une inconsolable mémoire, une mémoire 
d‘ombres et de pierre‖7 (11:10). She ponders the crisis of history and memory brought 
                                                 
5  ―Were you there, in Hiroshima? — No… Of course.‖ 
6  ―No, you are not endowed with memory.‖ 
7  ―Like you, I, too, fought with all my strength against oblivion. Like you, I forgot. Like you, I 





forth by this oubli, which materially translates to the bomb, but finds it impossible to 
counteract it; to go back to an edenic conception of history, eternal, teleological, and 
rational. She would like to have a memory beyond consolation, that is to say not 
requiring the consolation of a purpose, but one that is able to interiorize the Camusian 
absurd. The sequence continues: ―J‘ai lutté pour mon compte, de toutes mes forces, 
chaque jour, contre l‘horreur de ne plus comprendre du tout le pourquoi de se souvenir. 
Comme toi j‘ai oublié...‖8 (11:30). The point of rupture corresponding to the bombing 
can be seen as a rupture in the chain of signifiers, the entrance into a timeline where 
meaning can longer be assigned. This moment of the unspeakable threatens not only the 
ability to make sense but also the structure of sense-making. In other words, a moment of 
the unspeakable destabilizes referential sense-making systems (like the chain of 
signifiers) that depend on continuity; since, once there is an element that the system 
cannot process, the continuity is broken.   
 The film hints at the unique nature of the Bombing of Hiroshima as the 
start of a larger process: ―Lui — Qu‘est-ce que c'était pour toi, Hiroshima en France? Elle 
— La fin de la guerre, je veux dire, complètement …. Le commencement d‘une peur 
inconnue‖9 (21:09). The ―unknown fear‖ is the inability to historicize, the loss of memory 
that plagues the protagonists is not limited to them now, but it is a feature of the 
postmodern framework. The collapse of the grand narrative of modernist history leads to 
the self-awareness of narrative, which in the film is represented when She is questioned: 
                                                 
8  ―I fought on my own, with all my strength, against the horror of no longer understanding at all the 
reasons to remember. Like you, I forgot.‖  
9   ―He —What was it like for you in France, Hiroshima? She —The end of the war, I mean, 





―Pourquoi tu es à Hiroshima?  —Un film. Je joue dans un film‖10 (16:47). This utterance 
is true both in the fictional diegetic sense and also in the historic sense, which now 
becomes intertwined with the extra-diegetic level: both Emmanuelle Riva and the 
character she plays are French actresses shooting in Hiroshima. The uncertainty on 
whether the utterance breaks the fourth wall or not speaks to the uncertainty of the wall 
being there in the first place; in other words, the separation between historical and 
fictional narratives is reduced to a minimum.  
A final point about Hiroshima is the ominous presence of night and silence. Since 
1947, the Doomsday Clock maintained by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has been 
used represents the likelihood of nuclear war, where midnight means nuclear war is 
imminent or underway. Hiroshima resorts to this symbol in several points: ―Elle — On 
dit qu‘il va faire de l‘orage avant la nuit‖11 (31:14); ―Elle —  La nuit, ca ne s'arrête jamais 
à Hiroshima? Lui — Jamais ca ne s'arrête, à Hiroshima‖12 (1:02:40); ―La nuit ne vas pas 
finir‖13 (1:14:00). Apart from the association of night and death on a personal level, night 
here stands for the threat of the end of historization and the material end of events, and 
thus, history. The night of nuclear war functions as this historical event horizon, a point 
of no return in a timeline that would render all other timelines unviable: the end of 
narratives and absolute silence.  
                                                 
10  ―Why are you in Hiroshima? —A film. I‘m acting in a film.‖  
11  ―She —It is said that it storms before nightfall.‖ 
12  ―She —Night; does it ever end in Hiroshima?  He— in Hiroshima, it never ends.‖ 





Second Archipelago: Cuba 
 If Hiroshima Mon Amour tells the story of the breakdown of the border 
between memory and history that comes with the first atomic bomb, then this film about 
Cuba and the crisis, signals the knot and its fate. Memorias del Subdesarrollo (1968) was 
directed by Tomás Gutierrez Alea and written by Edmundo Desnoes, and it is, probably, 
both authors‘ best known work. The plot revolves around Sergio, a bourgeois failed 
writer, furniture producer, and landlord. After it becomes more and more clear that the 
Cuban revolution will lead to a socialist state, his wife and family decide to flee to 
Miami. Sergio decides to stay to examine the course of the revolution, or at least that is 
the excuse he gives his family, since the precarious state of their marriage is revealed 
early in the film. 
The first scene after the title credits shows Sergio saying hugging his wife in the 
airport, as she prepares to leave Cuba. After leaving his arms, he mouths a couple of 
words, but nothing comes out (Desnoes 3:44). His wife and family are not the only ones 
leaving Cuba: ―La Habana 1961 — NUMEROSAS PERSONAS ABANDONAN EL 
PAÍS‖14 (Desnoes 2:08). These ―numerous people‖ are the Cuban bourgeois: all wearing 
suits, ties, hats, and pearls, and have the means to suddenly leave the country. This 
bourgeois exodus is especially damaging to a country like pre-revolutionary Cuba: 
extremely unequal in terms of wealth and education, and heavily invested in the creation 
of a liberal, European-style, nation state. As Adam Sharman points out, ―‗The people‘ 
may figure in European anthems and constitutional tracts, but it is the bourgeoisie which 
manages both the nation and representations of the nation, making the nation in its own 
                                                 





image and making itself the citizen or, rather, subject of the nation‖ (Sharman 647). The 
loss of the bourgeoisie means in this case the loss of the manager of the state and of 
national identity.  
The now declassed Sergio goes back home and immediately sits down at the 
typewriter: ―Todos los que me querían y estuvieron jodiendo hasta el último minuto se 
fueron‖15 (Desnoes 6:00).  Much in the same spirit as Hiroshima Mon Amour, Sergio is 
writing his journal, which, at the same time, is the film we are watching about him 
writing his journal. The mise-en-abîme reëstablishes the historiographical function of the 
film: to remember an event that cannot be witnessed, and thus the necessity of blurring 
the lines between historical and fictional narratives. One of Sergio‘s first lines of dialog 
confronts the historiographical crisis he finds himself in: ―Llevo años diciendome que si 
tuviera tiempo me sentara y escribiera un libro de cuentos o llevara un diario… ahora voy 
a saber si tengo algo que decir‖16 (6:40). Much like the female protagonist of Hiroshima, 
Sergio has lost his capacity to memorialize.  
Sergio realizes he is now in an ahistorical situation when he looks out the window 
and declares: ―Aquí todo sigue igual. Así, de pronto, parece una escenografía, una ciudad 
de cartón‖17 (8:10). The historical narrative has lost its metaphysical aura and is now 
exposed as a societal construct, and a flimsy one at that.   
Memorias, like Hiroshima, does not follow a linear progression. Here, the 
narrative goes, unannounced, to the worst parts of his marriage when he‘s torturing his 
wife with recordings of her voice (9:50). Then, jumping again to the future, Sergio‘s life 
                                                 
15  ―Everyone who loved me and annoyed me until the very end is now gone.‖ 
16  ―I‘ve been telling myself for years that, if I had time, I‘d sit down and write a storybook or a 
diary… Now I‘ll know if I have anything to say.‖ 





narrative has lost any structure: he‘s alone except for one friend who is also leaving, he 
seduces several women, his writings are disconnected and his self-image becomes more 
and more broken. After a political roundtable, supposedly revolutionary but an event that 
seems to Sergio as simply a rehash of the old society, he is walking around on his own 
(1:07:00), his feelings of alienation reaching their acme: ―The round table ends, Sergio 
leaves and the film cuts to a long shot of him walking alone. The camera gradually zooms 
in on Sergio until he is so close that his image is obliterated. This visual obliteration is 
accompanied by the protagonist‘s own voice-over...: ‗ahora empieza, Sergio, tu 
destrucción final‘18‖ (Sharman 655). Sergio‘s personal breakdown comes as a result of 
the fall of his class and of his national identity. The liberal bourgeois state that is at the 
center of the nation-state project needs the teleological model of history to justify itself 
and now, at the cusp of the October Crisis, all metanarratives have lost validity, 
especially for Cubans in the eye of the storm: ―The decomposition of the image is the 
prelude to Sergio‘s disintegration...: he laments the lost relationship with Hanna; is tried 
for seducing Elena; learns of the imminent Missile Crisis and slowly goes to pieces, 
shocked by people‘s insouciance‖ (Sharman 655). The collective loss of telos that the 
breakdown of modernity produces also implies the individual loss of telos. A narrative 
with a future and a goal make no sense to him in a country that has lost the means to plot 
its way forward. 
It is at this point that the film enters the October Crisis, in scenes during which 
Sergio has virtually no lines. With scrolling text and voiceovers of Kennedy‘s and 
Castro‘s speeches over newsreels, the film shows the failed attempt made by the modern 
                                                 





nation-states to historicize the crisis. The film cuts to white and, seemingly, to an 
explosion, static overwhelming the audio channel, light overwhelming the visual channel 
(Desnoes 1:32:25); but, immediately afterwards, we see Sergio walking alone again, this 
time by the ocean. The next scene alternates cuts of Sergio in his apartment suffering an 
existential crisis, and images of tanks and other military equipment being deployed; it 
seems that he has nothing left to do but wait for the end. The shot shows the Cuban 
military deployment in Havana, with Sergio looking on in silence and impotence; the film 
cuts to white -- his nuclear experience of a narrative exploding, like a bomb demolishing 
his world 
When discussing what he deems ―apocalyptic events,‖ Antoine Bousquet 
describes them as ―revelatory and prophetic experiences which rupture our sense of 
continuity of time, thus forming a temporal break and omnipresent point of reference 
around which we subsequently reïnscribe our historical and political narratives both 
leading to the event and flowing from it‖ (741). Although this description is very useful 
to think about an event such as 9/11in the United States, or even the bombing of 
Hiroshima, it is still not radical enough to deal with the counterfactual of nuclear war 
posed by the Crisis, because there formers are only locally apocalyptic events, while after 
the latter there can be no ―political or historical narratives… flowing from it;‖ it is the 
very end of narratives. The threat of permanent silence makes historiography aware of its 
own bodily limits and contingency, and creates the existential moment of history that 






The two films in the scope of this study confront the single greatest issue of the 
postmodern era when history, as their protagonists know it, has collapsed.  How to speak 
of the unspeakable? How to render into a narrative that which cannot be witnessed or 
retold? The concept of the sublime, formulated by Immanuel Kant as part of his work in 
aesthetics, is that which ―is absolutely great… what is beyond all comparison great. What 
is indicated is not a pure concept of understanding, still less an intuition of the senses; 
and just as little is it a concept of reason, for it does not import any principle of 
cognition‖ (Kant 78-79). Following from this definition, the sublime cannot be 
begriffen19 through reason, nor perceived with the senses, nor imagined (and thus 
described); it is that which escapes the human mind and its capacity to memorialize and 
historicize. I hold that the expanding narrative arc, reaching from Hiroshima's destruction 
to the possible normalization of utter destruction that people like Sergio confront in the 
Cuba of the October Crisis, is properly located in the liminal space between history and 
the sublime. Nuclear war, of which we catch a glimpse from this side of the historical 
event horizon, has become the new master signifier of the Cold War era, reaching to past 
narratives of ideology and national threats. The atom bomb, thus, came to be seen as the 
culmination of total war, the purest expression of conflict‘s escalation in intensity and 
breadth, the harnessing and projection of all available energies for the purpose of the 
complete submission of the enemy, including through his total destruction if necessary. 
The two films sketched here, Hiroshima and Memorias, are thus both engaged in an 
impossible task: comprehending the ―unthinkable‖ (Bousquet 758). Hiroshima attempts 






to memorialize the event of the bombing by circumlocuting it. Describing all the events 
of personal memory before, and after, and around, it remains fully aware of its inability to 
narrate the event in order to rationalize it or historicize it; instead the film opts for 
aestheticizing the effects of the bombing as vaguely comprehensible memory rather than 
properly fact-based history; in Symbolist fashion: ―Peindre, non la chose, mais l'effet 
qu'elle produit.‖20 (Mallarmé 307). Memorias takes more from a later, evolving, absurdist 
philosophical position contained within the escalation of the Cold War into mutually 
assured destruction, thus reinforcing the materiality of human existence over and against 
the mostly irrational internal logic of national narratives that no longer serve their nations 
or their citizens. The self-manifestation of the limits of rationality and the power of the 
absurd make it hard for Sergio, and the modern subject, to continue existing in a world 
without a telos.  
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